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Informalitya b s t r a c t
This article explores political and moral economies of diasporic investment in urban property. It chal-
lenges uncritical policy discourses on migrant investment that romanticise transnational family and
entrepreneurial networks by assuming diasporic social embeddedness, mutual trust, risk-reduction
and socio-economic beneﬁts, often founded in neo-liberal assumptions. The article elaborates alternate
starting propositions emphasising the conﬂicting interests and predatory business practices that charac-
terise informalised state governance and episodes of crisis. It stresses the importance of understanding
changing regulatory regimes over ﬁnance and urban property. Migrants’ desires need to be scrutinised
in relation to those of a range of other actors who cannot be assumed to have convergent interests
– including relatives, investment advisors, money transfer companies, estate agents, property developers.
The article takes the case of hyperinﬂationary Zimbabwe, where remittances from the displaced middle
classes not only provided essential familial support, but were also materialised in urban real estate,
contributing to inﬂated property prices and a residential construction boom in the capital city. Diasporic
investors were vulnerable to fraud due to the combination of effects of fantasies of successful return to
dream homes and irregular regimes for remittances and property. But there were notable speculative
opportunities for those with government connections. New diaspora suburbs and homes that have trans-
formed the landscape of the Harare periphery stand as material testimony to the intersection of emigré
sentimentality and the speculative informalised economy of the crisis years.
 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).Introduction
Diaspora investment in property here cannot be for purely
ﬁnancial reasons, a level headed person would invest elsewhere
. . .it’s either sentimentality or speculation. . .
[Investment consultant, Harare, 16 December 2010]
On 20 January 2006, the diaspora newspaper, The Zimbabwean,
ran a headline ‘Homelink scam exposed’.1 Tendai Mauchaza, a Zim-
babwean social worker based in Leeds, accused the government
diaspora investment scheme, Homelink, of cheating him. Mauchaza
had been paying monthly instalments for a luxurious Spanish villa
to be built on the Charlotte Brooke estate in the capital’s upmarket
suburb of Borrowdale Brooke. But the plans had been changed with-
out his knowledge, and he had not received keys or title deeds.A relative who had inspected the property on his behalf described
a partially completed building made of home-made bricks that were
crumbling in the rain, on a site 26 km out of town in the rural area of
Domboshawa. In response to the story, readers in the UK, USA, Can-
ada and elsewhere wrote into the paper’s ‘property watch’ forum
with their own tales of frustration at Homelink: ‘No mercy from gov-
ernment thieves’; ‘Fellow countrymen, beware!’ ‘Homelink was only
set up to RIP OFF diasporans of their hard-earned money. STOP
THESE HOMETHIEVES NOW!!’. 2
Homelink was unpopular in the diaspora for political reasons as
well as concerns about predatory, irregular modes of operating. Yet
the scheme was part of a broader proliferation of new businesses
offering transnational ﬁnancial and investment services to Zim-
babweans living abroad. These businesses emerged to meet the
demand within the diaspora for means to remit and take advan-
tage of what foreign currency could materialise in the irregular
money and property markets of Zimbabwe’s crisis economy. The1/02/06;
6; Fedup
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ling a residential construction boom in Zimbabwe’s capital Harare
that peaked as hyperinﬂation spiralled out of control. Stories circu-
lated of students, nurses and carers becoming the proud owners of
amazing mansions. By February 2009, when the Zimbabwe dollar
was withdrawn and the Inclusive Government was formed
between the ruling ZANU(PF) and the two opposition Movement
for Democratic Change (MDC) parties, ushering in a period of rela-
tive economic stability, the landscape of the Harare periphery and
satellite towns showed the signs of a decade of politicised and
irregular new residential building. Migrants had bought up exist-
ing housing throughout the city, as well as speculating and build-
ing on new plots (called ‘stands’ in Zimbabwe). Newmiddling class
‘cluster’ developments, and medium to low density ‘diaspora sub-
urbs’ on the city fringes and in Harare’s satellite towns, however,
were particularly associated with diasporic investment. Some
who beneﬁtted during the crisis period – individual migrants and
directors of property companies – even spoke with a degree of nos-
talgia about the times when ‘a poor man in the diaspora could buy
the best house in town’3 and ‘US$100 would buy a whole truckload
of cement’.4
This article explores the political and moral economy of this
episode of diaspora investment in property to several ends. First,
it develops new strands of inquiry into international migrants’
role in shaping city spaces (Glick Schiller and Çaglar, 2011), by
calling for greater attention to the ways in which diasporic remit-
tances relate to trajectories of change in homeland cities, and the
effects of changes in state governance. In so doing, it extends
Glick Schiller and Çaglar’s agenda for bringing together migration
and urban studies, which focuses on the relationship between
migrants’ differential incorporation and urban rescaling processes
in countries of settlement. Their framework, which concentrates
on Western cities and places explanatory weight on neo-liberal
transformations, largely ignores debates over intersections with
urban dynamics and governance in countries of emigration. Yet
new ‘diaspora suburbs’ and other material transformations to
homeland cityscapes, which are the tangible manifestation of
diasporic investment, are produced through particular and chang-
ing state regimes. They are inadequately explained simply
through invocations of neoliberalism or explorations of migrants’
aspirations.
Second, the article provides a critique of policy discourses on
diasporic transnational investment. Government and international
agencies have encouraged such investment, as part of a policy shift
‘beyond remittances’ to ‘tap diasporic wealth’ more broadly
(Terrazas, 2010; Plaza and Ratha, 2011). The logic lying behind
these policies is frequently based on abstract economistic calcula-
tions showing the beneﬁts of transnational ﬁnancialisation
through its stimulus to construction industries, employment and
potential to alleviate housing shortages, often rooted in neo-liberal
assumptions. There is little attention to political economy and
potentially conﬂicting interests, or to the dynamics of irregular
routes and markets. Debates have generally focused on national
or household scales rather than exploring relationships to neigh-
bourhoods or cities. They tend to assume that migrants can navi-
gate high risk contexts because: ‘(1) diaspora investors beneﬁt
from special information regarding investment opportunities in
their countries of origin, and (2) that diaspora investors accept
below-market rates of return on investment due to patriotic senti-
ments’ (Terrazas, 2010: 9).
Such assumptions of superior knowledge and social embedded-
ness are, however, questionable: Terrazas believes they deserve a3 Interview, social worker building Harare home, 27/09/10; cf Director, property
company and member of Estate Agent Council Zimbabwe, 22/03/11.
4 Investment manager, Harare, 16/12/10.‘healthy degree of scepticism’ (2010:9). Moreover, in crisis contexts,
they can be particularly misleading (Lubkemann, 2008: 46). As Lub-
kemann elaborates, during crises, economic changes are profound,
spatially varied, politicised and unpredictable, while diasporic
interests at home are heterogenous and tend to rely on shifting
and informal channels (Lubkemann, 2008; Smith and Stares,
2007). Politicised crisis contexts can highlight the weaknesses in
policy discourses on migrant investment particularly starkly. As
there are continuities between ‘crisis’ and ‘non crisis’ contexts,
approaches that scrutinise political and moral economies rather
than assuming privileged diasporic knowledge or convergent inter-
ests have a wider, general application. Alternative starting assump-
tions need to avoid crude generalisations, not just of the
romanticised kind presented in developmental policy literatures,
but also un-nuanced critiques that would condemn all transna-
tional business opportunities in Africa as extensions of neo-
patrimonial networks. Rather it is important to recognise the
multiplicity of channels and varied relations with diverse states
(Davies, 2012). The analysis here of diasporic sentimentality and
the speculative investment opportunities of Zimbabwe’s irregular-
ised hyperinﬂationary economy thus furthers understanding not
only of the effects of remittances in crisis contexts (Brinkerhoff,
2008; Lubkemann, 2008; Lindley, 2009; Van Hear, 2011), but can
also provide lessons for developmental contexts and advance
broader policy debates.
Third, the article elaborates alternate propositions that can pro-
vide a better starting point for analyses of transnational diasporic
investment. These can be summarised as follows: (a) Flows of
money through family networks tend to be contentious and crisis
conditions exacerbate the potential for interests to diverge within
transnational families notwithstanding the premium on trust pro-
duced by extreme insecurity. (b) Diasporas (or sections of them)
can become disconnected from homeland communities over time,
and this can occur particularly rapidly in crisis contexts. (c) Oppor-
tunities for predatory businesses can open up during episodes of
political transition and neo-liberal deregulation, and ﬂourish in sit-
uations of repression and war. Such entrepreneurship should
receive as much attention as its philanthropic, ‘social’ counterpart.
Transnational businesses and their connections to state governance
regimes over ﬁnance and urban property need to be discussed in a
manner that is alert to diversity, shifting opportunities, heteroge-
neous interests and politicisation. (d) Informalised transnational
ﬁnance and property development businesses are imbricated with,
rather than separate from the state, and their relationship to chang-
ing modes of governance is centrally important. Roitman’s distinc-
tion between ‘state power’ and ‘state regulatory authority’ is useful
in making sense of ‘the supposed contradiction between the expan-
sion of unregulated activities – such as fraud and contraband, which
seem to indicate a loss of state control – . . . and the continuity of
state power in its military forms and its capacity for redistribution’
(Roitman, 2005: 20). Commentators on urban expansion in India,
China and parts of the former eastern block similarly invoke the
idea of ‘informalised state power’ to capture themutual imbrication
of state regimes with irregular credit and construction bubbles
(Roy, 2009; Woodworth and Ulfstjerne, 2014; Musaraj, 2011). (e)
The legacies of episodes of crisis are profound, multifaceted and
likely to be protracted over time.
The article is based on interviews with individual investors and
people working in institutions involved with transnational ﬁnance
and urban property in Zimbabwe’s capital Harare and satellite
towns (members of the Zimbabwe Real Estate Institute and the
Estate Agents’ Council, asset managers, local authority housing
departments, directors of companies offering advice, facilitating
purchases or building on behalf of Zimbabweans abroad). Harare’s
satellite towns of Ruwa and Norton were included because they
have been a particular focus for diasporic property investment.
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sonal experiences of buying or building homes and making other
investments, including 7 who used Homelink.5
Below, I situate the Zimbabwe case within a comparative litera-
ture on migrants’ investment in African cities and broader debates
over informalised urban property regimes, before exploring the sen-
timentality that fosters the desire to build at home, and the familial
and business networks that translate aspirations and remittances
into real estate.
African cities, informalised governance and crisis economics
African urban landscapes show the legacies of long-standing and
diverse histories of transnational connection and investment. Yet
recent diasporic building ‘at home’ on the part of the continent’s
increasingly transnational middle classes has not featured promi-
nently in the literature on African urban growth.6 In much of West
Africa, migrant building was dispersed in villages and ‘home towns’
(Osili, 2004; Arimah, 2002; Okonkwo, 2002; Smith and Mazzucato,
2009) and has only recently concentrated in capital cities (Smith
and Mazzucato (2009), explicable partly through transformed family
relationships (Henry andMohan, 2003). In Ghana’s burgeoning capita
Accra, however, ‘quality residential sprawl’ on the city periphery
reﬂects investment by the country’s new middle classes, many of
whom live transnational lives, or are return migrants from Western
cities (Grant, 2007; Yeboah, 2000, 2003; Smith and Mazzucato,
2009). While policy agendas may cast such entrepreneurial migrant
investors as beneﬁtting from and taking forward neo-liberal agendas,
Henry and Mohan see diasporic transnational familial, entrepreneur-
ial and associational networks not just as beneﬁciaries, but also as
ﬁlling the gaps left by the retreating state, particularly welfare, social
support and developmental roles (Henry and Mohan, 2003; Mohan,
2008; Mercer et al., 2008). Grant casts migrants’ transnational
home-building practices as ‘a coping strategy for navigating a difﬁ-
cult residential environment’ (Grant, 2007: 53).
But the conﬂicts that typify diasporic investment in risky, often
irregularly governed and rapidly changing urban property markets
deserve further attention, for which neo-liberalism provides inad-
equate explanation. In Somaliland’s swelling capital city of Harge-
isa, Samater (n.d.) elaborates how migrants’ and returnees’
investments in urban real estate caused displacements and dispute
between ‘land-holding’ clans and ‘newcomers’. Diaspora investors
complained loudly about the untrustworthiness of the ‘agents’
who serviced them. In Addis Ababa, a government scheme to foster
diasporic investment in urban land and property drove prices
upwards to the point of disadvantaging local purchasers, provoking
such criticism that the policy was reversed and diasporic privileges
withdrawn (Terrazas, 2010: 21). In Harare too, diasporic invest-
ment in property has been contentious, and is part of an uncom-
fortable ‘pairing of dispossession and wealth creation’ that is
typical of crisis contexts (Roitman, 2005:15). Indeed, the tangibility
of accumulation in the form of new homes built at a time of eco-
nomic implosion fuelled resentful stereotypes of diaspora riches
(Maimbodei, 2007; Magaisa, 2006).7 These were desperate times5 Interviews were conducted between 2010 and 2012. Diasporic investors and
returnees were selected through the interviewers’ own social networks. All intervie-
wees have been anonymised, and names used herein are pseudonyms.
6 I use middle/middling class loosely in this article, assuming that the minority of
those within the diaspora who had money to buy property or embark on building
projects during the crisis were seen as such within Zimbabwe. This does not reﬂect
the complexities of transnational dimensions to class (ie the realities of low status,
poorly remunerated work for many).
7 Masiiwa and Doroh’s survey (2010:10–11) found 30% of Zimbabweans abroad
invested at home, with property being the most popular form of investment, closely
followed by transport, while Magunha et al. (2009) reported only one out of ﬁve
Zimbabweans in Leeds sent money home for anything beyond families’ day-to-day
survival.for most people, when formal employment disappeared, urban live-
lihoods collapsed and the country slid rapidly down the Human
Development Index, from a position of 50 to 150 (out of 177) and
there was a dramatic exodus of up to a third of the population
(Chimhowu et al., 2010; Crush and Tevera, 2010; McGregor, 2010).
The country was not in the grip of neo-liberal austerity measures:
rather the opportunities and costs of its hyperinﬂationary, informa-
lised economy were shaped by some of the most stringent ﬁscal con-
trols in the world, plus episodes of militarised and politicised state
interventions in urban economies that rendered legal business
impossible (Hammar et al., 2010).
While Zimbabwe’s ‘casino economy’ (Gono, 2008) was in many
ways exceptional, there are similarities between the analysis pre-
sented here of changing state governance, with interpretations of
irregular modes of governing India’s rapidly growing cities, the
credit and construction bubbles of urbanising China or post-
socialist Albania (Roy, 2009; Woodworth and Ulfstjerne, 2014;
Verdery, 1995), and the systemic ‘ﬁscal disobedience’ in episodes
of crisis in various parts of West Africa (Roitman, 2005; Guyer
et al., 2002). In these contexts, state urban institutions became
‘informalised entities’ (Roy, 2009 on Indian cities), with the sus-
pension or circumvention of law or planning regulations and
growth of unregulated business marking the emergence of new
forms of state power (cf Woodworth and Ulfstjerne, 2014, on
Ordos, China). Regarding hyperinﬂationary Zimbabwe, it can be
helpful to consider processes of informalisation in relation to
two key domains of state control – over ﬁnance (remittances,
currency conversions, credit, interbank transfers) and urban real
estate.
Transnational ﬂows of foreign currency from the diaspora
were a prime object of government regulation from early in the
crisis. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) sought to monopolise
access to this in-coming money and legislated ﬁxed ofﬁcial
exchange rates. Police shut down exchange bureaux and
commercial remittance agencies such as Western Union, and
bankers were among those forced into exile accused of
unpatriotic behaviour in the form of ‘externalising ﬁnance’.
Ordinary people could not access their own money in banks
due to a shortage in supply of Zimbabwe Dollars and limits on
the amounts that could be withdrawn, and RBZ seized foreign
exchange in personal and institutional accounts. Mortgages ceased
to be available from 2005 except to those with government
connections. State regulation thus produced a gap in ﬁnancial
services, which was quickly ﬁlled by informal businesses, in
which RBZ and state agents were themselves implicated.
The black money markets that emerged on the streets of Zimba-
bwe’s cities (supplied by remittances) quickly became the centre of
economic life (Jones, 2010b). For those who had foreign currency to
sell, there were gains to be made by conversions at black market
rates into Zimbabwe Dollars or goods. But for well-placed individ-
uals with government contacts, gains could be truly spectacular, if
foreign currency could be bought with Zimbabwe Dollars at ofﬁcial
rates and then ‘burnt’ (Mawowa and Matongo, 2010). ‘Burning’
money was the term applied to the processes that allowed for
magical, exponential gains simply by exploiting discrepancies
between ofﬁcial and black market exchange rates, cash and cheque
rates, or dual listed shares. Burnt money gained value spectacularly
by circulating in this way, and could be materialised highly advan-
tageously in speciﬁc goods where companies allowed these to be
purchased through interbank transfer.8 The RBZ itself came to
depend on such irregular circuits and conversions, by buying hard
currency from street markets with freshly printed Zimbabwe
Dollars, then burning it (Mawowa and Matongo, 2010; Jones,8 This applied to mobile phone top up cards for a time, also to cement.
J. McGregor /Geoforum 56 (2014) 172–181 1752010a, 2010b). More and more Zimbabwe Dollars were printed, with
ever diminishing value, such that inﬂation reached 68 trillion % by
November 2008 (Jones, 2010b).
The potential gains to be made in this context were thus pro-
duced through informalised state ﬁnancial regimes, but the advan-
tageous conversions into real estate also reﬂected changes in urban
property markets and informalised urban governance. The soaring
prices for property during the crisis were universally blamed on
diaspora investment. But there was also a rush within the country
to translate money into things that would retain value, as ‘holding
on to money was throwing it away’,9 and individuals as well as
companies transferred assets into land and property as a hedge
against inﬂation. Rising property prices also reﬂected the growing
shortages of housing, exacerbated by the mass demolitions of Oper-
ation Murambatsvina in 2005 through which 700,000 people lost
their homes and/or livelihoods (Potts, 2006).
Transformations to urban governance were politicised as
ZANU(PF) aimed to punish urban voters and undermine or suspend
opposition-run municipalities, enhancing central state control
(McGregor, 2013; Marongwe et al., 2011). Central state/military
interventions such as the rebuilding programme known as Opera-
tion LiveWell,made newhousing accessiblemainly to familieswith
ruling party connections (Mpofu, 2011). But the deregulation of
urban land and property development (through the Parallel Devel-
opment Act of 2006) was centrally important to processes of infor-
malisation. It created opportunities for private developers to raise
the funds to service and develop land by selling plots in advance of
any investment. Developers were often unscrupulous, and sold land
onwithout servicing it adequately. Urban land could be bought for a
pittance in ZimbabweDollars by thosewith connections, and soldon
irregularly or developed for huge gain to the diaspora market.
The extraordinary opportunities created by the hyperinﬂation-
ary, informalised economy altered attitudes towards risk. The crisis
was a time of ‘speculation with no thought of tomorrow – because
inﬂation would take care of a bad decision made today’.10 Indeed,
those maximally in debt had most to gain. By 2004, it cost banks
more to service mortgages than to cancel them: people who were
over-extended reaped the beneﬁts and were summoned to collect
their title deeds, as debts of 1 million Zimbabwe Dollars were now
worth no more than a loaf of bread. The deepening crisis was widely
experienced as a time of ‘madness’, and fostered an opportunistic
outlook that suspended usual moral judgements (Jones, 2010a,
2010b). Discourses of ‘need’ and ‘survival’ justiﬁed ‘zigzag’ deals
and make-do attitudes associated with the urban social margins
came to characterise economic life more broadly including big busi-
ness and state administration (Jones, 2010b). Property development
and transnational ﬁnancial services were no exception.
These changes in regulatory regimes and modes of business cre-
ated a treacherous environment for longdistance investment.More-
over, for many migrants, there was also a political calculation: how
toprevent the government that had caused the exodus fromsustain-
ing and enriching itself by taking a cut? Diasporic investors differed
in their capacity to reap rewards, due to their varying ability to gen-
erate cash and travel, their particular familial networks, political
connections and judgements. But investment was not just about
proﬁt, anddecisionswere far fromstraightforwardﬁnancial calcula-
tions. As such, the moral imaginations and values they reﬂect
deserve closer scrutiny.
Sentimentality or speculation?
The motivations for investing in property on the part of Zimbab-
wean emigrés were shaped above all by the desire to return, and to9 Interview, asset manager, Harare, 16/12/10.
10 Interview, property company director and REI executive, 6/04/11.return successfully. This echoes the aspirations documented in
other studies of migrant communities (on Nigerians and Ghanaians
see Osili, 2004; Smith and Mazzucato, 2009; Akeampong, 2000)
‘People are buying not so much as an investment per se, but with
the idea of future return, to insure that future’, a property consul-
tant argued.11 Moral imaginations of successful return hinged on
several components: a substantial house, assets that would allow
self-sufﬁciency, meeting family responsibilities, and, ideally, security
outside as well as inside Zimbabwe. ‘To go back’, one nurse visiting
from Australia argued, ‘I need to have invested – I have done the
small project, building a cottage, and I met my family obligations
with a truck for my dad, and sponsored my sister’s university degree.
Now I’m embarking on the real thing. . . [a big house]’.12 Size clearly
matters in this reasoning, and the quest for demonstrable achieve-
ment is familiar from other studies of migrants’ homes, documenting
a tendency towards ‘conspicuous construction’ (Thomas, 1998, on
Madagascar), with migrant mansions in West Africa acting as ‘self-
made memorials and demonstrations of civic pride’ (Osili, 2004),
or ‘testimony to a worthy life. . . and self-esteem’ (Smith and
Mazzucato, 2009).
Obligations to family were central to Zimbabwean moral imag-
inations (cf West African diasporas, Smith and Mazzucato, 2009;
Lubkemann, 2008; Osili, 2004). Rationales for investing in property
sometimes included the goal of generating rent and reducing the
onerous burden of remitting. Yet income-generating rationales
came through less strongly in relation to property than other
investments (particularly transport), partly because of the con-
straints on successfully collecting rent in desperate times, and
because rent laws favour tenants (cf Marongwe et al., 2011). Osili
(2004) likewise found that direct economic returns to migrants
from property in Nigeria were ‘unclear’: most houses were used
by relatives for free, some were unoccupied except when migrants
returned for a visit, and only a tiny minority were rented out.
Where Zimbabwean emigrés invested in more than one property,
the economic utility was clearer, with stands and houses acting
as collateral for other projects. As Grant concludes for Ghanaians
abroad, housing is often ‘part of a broader investment relationship
with home’ (Grant 2005).
Zimbabwean narratives placed a strong emphasis on eco-
nomic ‘self-sufﬁciency’ (again echoing other migrants, such as
Ghanaians, Akeampong, 2000: 206) and the security of ‘ﬂexible
citizenship’ (Ong, 1998). They emphasised the importance of
investing in assets and rights outside Zimbabwe to provide
for future mobility and a ‘fall back’ option that was often
considered a necessary precondition to return (cf Mortensen,
2014).
Interestingly, housing was seen as a ‘safe’ investment (cf Smith
and Mazzucato, 2009 on Ghana). This partly reﬂected the spectacu-
lar devaluation of the Zimbabwe Dollar. But Zimbabweans lacked
experience of property bubbles and many took advantage of easy
credit for mortgages in the UK as well as buying up as much as they
could at home. Distance from the sheer chaos of life in hyperinﬂa-
tionary Zimbabwe also played a part, and decisions were made
without full appreciation of the rapid informalisation of construc-
tion, the spread of substandard building and growing corruption in
state institutions, including those regulating urban property. The
extreme returns on hard currency that were possible during the
crisis meant that investments were not always made carefully:
‘By the time a diasporan rings me for advice’, an asset manager
argued, ‘they have generally already decided to buy, and what they
want fromme is reassurance over the price of the property they are
interested in, rather than asking about returns or asking for more11 Director, property company and member EAC, Harare, 22/03/11.
12 Interview, Harare, 26/08/10.
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asked...’13 A young woman working in the UK recalled her own
lack of caution, ‘We didn’t know what to do with our money! We
could buy up lots of things at home – we were buying nice cars,
stands, building houses’.14 Another diaspora investor reﬂected
self-critically on how, faced with an opportunity to acquire a loan
to build his dream home he ‘grabbed the opportunity with wide
open arms. . .Reﬂecting now, I didn’t give myself time to think
critically . . .’15
Impulsive investments in real estate from a distance were not
always ‘safe’ in practice. Indeed, narratives of building frequently
begin with accounts of disastrous waste. But the wealth accumu-
lated by some shored up expectations of what was possible and
what a successful return could – or should – look like, as the exam-
ple of two teachers’ new assets can illustrate:
Mrs. and Mr. Moyo ‘became established’ through their stint
teaching in the UK. Going there in 2000 was ‘an adventure’, as
they already had several low density residential properties as
a result of teaching in Botswana, but their sojourn ‘allowed
the family to become self-sufﬁcient. . .and to create a fall back
outside’. Acquiring a commercial tobacco farm through land
reform in 2004, they used wealth generated in Britain to pur-
chase trucks and other farming equipment to get production
going and completed another low density home in Harare. They
straddled both countries through the crisis with Mr. Moyo stay-
ing out to generate hard currency, while Mrs. Moyo ‘tried to see
if we could make it work back in Zimbabwe’. They were cau-
tious about returning, doing so only when they had British pass-
ports and a UK mortgage.16
In explaining their success, the couple emphasised that they
were ‘risk takers’, but took ‘well calculated risks’. They put partic-
ular emphasis on the strength of their family bonds and capacity to
oversee Zimbabwean investments personally, while also recognis-
ing their sheer good luck and the role of their political connections
in getting land. Others who considered themselves to have
returned successfully echoed this emphasis on trustworthy family
networks, such as Mr. Mandishona, a supply teacher in the UK who
had previously been the manager of a state company in Zimbabwe
but returned as a transport entrepreneur:17
Over 5 years in the UK between 2001 and 2006 working as a
supply teacher, Mr. Mandishona ﬁnished building a low density
home in a Norton, constructed a second low density home in
Harare from scratch and bought a further 6 residential stands.
He and his wife (also in Britain) took out a joint mortgage on
a UK property and raised the credit for 2 haulage trucks. Mr.
Mandishona returned (without his wife and children, now Brit-
ish citizens) because he hated life in Britain and didn’t want ‘to
pile up properties while not enjoying’. When still in the UK he
built a tuck shop for his sister (destroyed in the demolitions
of 2005), and a kombi for his brother (which he sold as ‘I never
got a cent from him . . . we wanted to promote business at
home, but people hate the diaspora here’). His cross border
transport business allowed him to buy 3 shops and more trucks,
and to continue supporting the UK mortgage plus a new wife
and baby in Zimbabwe.
Though transport businesses of any scale generally require con-
nections, this was not emphasised in his account, which dwelt at13 Interview, asset manager, 16/12/10.
14 Interview, Rachel, Harare, 10/08/10.
15 Interview, diaspora investor, 16/09/11.
16 Interview, Harare, 28/08/10.
17 Interview, Norton, 8/08/10.length on the importance of his own frequent returns to supervise
projects and the trustworthiness of his nephew.
These examples of successful projects help to shed light on
diasporic ‘sentimentality’. But it is also clear from the above that
an understanding of these desires cannot in itself explain the out-
come of investments. The fact that most people have not returned,
that narratives of investment are so commonly incomplete, or are
about disappointment and projects turned liabilities means that
understandings of risk require an appreciation of differential posi-
tioning and connections, and a better understanding of the broader
political economy of the channels through which money ﬂows and
is translated into assets. As investment narratives begin with kin, it
is appropriate to continue this discussion through a fuller explora-
tion of the roles, tensions with, and perspectives of family at home
servicing migrants abroad.
Transnational family and investment: the tensions of
reciprocity
Most diaspora projects began with family members at home
and involved irregular routes – smuggling cash into the country,
and then building informally through relatives. Indeed family net-
works undoubtedly remain the most important channel for invest-
ment. The romanticized view of transnational family relationships
in the diaspora investment literature can fail to capture the ‘ten-
sions, strains. . . and potential for acrimonious conﬂict and brea-
ched relations as well as the mutual interest of family’
(Baldassar, 2007; Olwig, 2002). Yet Smith and Mazzucato’s study
of Ghanaian highlights the potential for familial conﬂict through
its emphasis on how relatives overseeing projects anticipate their
‘chop’ – indeed felt that ‘‘‘chopping’’ was an inherent and accepted
part of the agreement’ (2009:69).
Crisis conditions exacerbated the potential for misunderstand-
ing and a breakdown of trust within families over money (cf
Guyer et al., on Nigeria 2002: xxxviii). One nurse described ‘once
you are in the diaspora, no one is your relative, you’re just a cash
cow with a dollar sign on your face. . .’18 Another professional ech-
oed, ‘everyone I knew, friends, family, former colleagues – had a plan
for my money, advice as to what I should do with it – I didn’t know
who to trust – I didn’t trust anyone!’19 Most of those we interviewed
described tension with family members at home over mismanage-
ment of remittances. Indeed, being ‘swindled by relatives’ was a
recurrent motif, as the following cases illustrate:
A former clerk went to the UK in 2001 where he trained as a
nurse. Over subsequent years he saved enough to buy 3 proper-
ties in Harare, two for himself in medium/low density suburbs
plus one in a high density suburb of the satellite town of Chi-
tungwiza to accommodate his destitute relatives (his father,
plus brothers and family). In 2009 he was forced to make an
unplanned visit to Zimbabwe because a friend told him that
someone had copied his ID document and title deeds and sold
his Harare Westgate property fraudulently. He hired lawyers
to make a police case, but as the only person who could have
had access to the documents was a relative ‘I just left it as it
would tear the family apart’. But he also rushed to protect his
other upmarket property from the same fate, selling it hastily
for cash which he used as a down payment on a mortgage in
the UK.20
Glenda took up a nursing job in Britain in 2004 and bought a
stand in the low density parts of Harare’s Glen Lorne suburb,18 Interview, Harare, 25/02/11.
19 Interview Harare, 12/12/11.
20 Interview, David, Harare, 26/02/11.
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father. Her husband went back in 2008 to check on progress
only to ﬁnd a disaster: the cement had been mixed with sand,
the building was cracking, an inspector declared it unsound
and denied permission for work to continue. ‘I was so upset
and disappointed’ Glenda recounted, ‘But what could I do? All
I could do was shout down the phone as this was my father’.
She had the structure pulled down and started building again,
using professionals and other relatives to oversee the new
project.21
Another nurse working in Britain 2001–9 – Christine – bought a
low density stand in Harare and started to build in 2007 via her
uncle. He found a construction company that gave regular pro-
gress reports and sent pictures conﬁrmed by her sister. Chris-
tine paid extra money for the foundations when her uncle
told her the land was swampy. But then a friend asked if she
wanted to sell her vacant stand and she became very suspicious.
The friend investigated and found that the uncle had taken all
the money, tricking the sister by showing her progress on a dif-
ferent plot. Christine was furious, sold the plot and bought
another, returning in 2009 to supervise building herself, while
also mobilising relatives to demand repayment from the
uncle.22
Although in these instances, those tricked by family at home did
not turn to the courts to pursue their grievances, many have done
so. Magistrates conﬁrmed the signiﬁcant numbers of cases brought
by emigrés concerning conﬂict with relatives over property. The
cases fell into the following categories: (1) divorce cases; (2) abuse
of power of attorney (ie powers had not been formalised, or were
not understood, with the migrant giving general powers, which
were abused (3) sale of false title deeds; (4) eviction cases, where
property had been let out by migrants who faced problems in col-
lecting rent or evicting tenants.23
Although the untrustworthiness of relatives at home is central
to many emigrés’ investment narratives, particularly those who
could not return to oversee their projects, the issue looks rather
different from the perspective of relatives at home. Stereotypes
of diasporic wealth underpinned the sense of entitlement to a
share of remittances on the part of those left behind. Indeed,
money remitted was often considered expendable because it was
assumed diasporans were ‘ﬂush with money’24 (cf Smith and
Mazzucato, 2009). It was widely held that those overseas did not
understand the difﬁculties at home and had developed interests of
their own.25 I attended more than one diaspora event during the cri-
sis, where a visiting religious ﬁgure or civic activist from Zimbabwe
began an address by berating the audience for selﬁshness: ‘Can’t you
think of better things to do with your money than build a 6 bedroom
house for your mother? Don’t you know people are suffering at
home?’26 In Zimbabwe, relatives made the argument that food and
other basic necessities were more important than the remitters’
building projects, with bare survival justifying diverting remittances.
It was stated repeatedly that those who were out ‘didn’t understand
– they’d ask for a quote, you’d get that, then they’d send the money
the next day, you’d queue to get the money, but by the time you got
back to the shop, that quote was out of date. . . something that cost 3
trillion Zimbabwe Dollars had gone up by the following day, or you21 Interview, Glenda, Harare, 23/02/11.
22 Interview, Christine, Harare, 27/01/11.
23 Interview, magistrate, Harare, 15/08/10.
24 Interview, relative of diaspora investor, Ruwa, 13/04/11.
25 Interview, Elias Mukonoweshuro, Harare, 23/08/10 (MDC-T, responsible for
external affairs).
26 Religious leader and community activist, visiting from Zimbabwe, addressing
meeting of asylum-seekers, London, 26/10/07.couldn’t get the cash. Quotes were not valid for 24 h. People didn’t
understand that.’27 One public servant who remained in Zimbabwe
during the crisis explained: ‘How could we buy cement for them
when we needed food? Some of us even sent photos of our neigh-
bours’ homes to keep them happy!’28 Others concurred that remit-
ters have ‘lofty ideas about their status – but they have developed
interests of their own, these new mansions show they have money
to spare’.29 The vocabulary used to describe emigrés’ expected dis-
plays of wealth is revealingly ambiguous, with returning migrants
described as ‘splashing money’, ‘showing off’, ‘shining’ or ‘boiling’.
Transnational property investment schemes
The difﬁculties of managing familial routes for investment can
help explain the demand for professional help in navigating the
treacherous terrain of property at home. Businesses providing such
services are widely regarded within the diaspora as ‘noble’ in pur-
pose. Building societies and property companies in Zimbabwe
developed ‘diaspora desks’ from the late 1990s, and over the course
of the crisis itself, the number of small companies offering advice,
transnational investment and building services proliferated.
Operating such a business was a delicate affair, given foreign
currency controls that made legal property transactions impossi-
ble. Property was supposed to change hands in Zimbabwe Dollars
(before 2009),30 yet supplies were short, the huge bundles of notes
were impractical, purchasers had hard currency, and there was a
constant need to ﬁnd routes outside RBZ reach. By 2007, most big
companies stopped dealing in property because of RBZ regulations.
But this created openings for small businesses prepared to take risks
or simply transact irregularly. As the director of one such noted, ‘The
opportunities were there. . .but it was a risk’.31 An investment man-
ager elaborated:
It wasn’t the really big guys [reaching out to the diaspora], the
ones with the names to protect. . . the diasporans are small fry –
the big guys don’t need that business. Who wants to make the
effort for someone with US$500 to invest, it doesn’t make sense,
unlike the small companies and conmen, they don’t mind,
they’ll target anyone.32
The modus operandi of businesses transacting at this time was
extraordinarily creative. One of those who continued through the
peak of the crisis recalled:
In early 2008, it was illegal to sell property in Forex, but people
were doing so quietly – you had to exchange money in a bag, or
outside the country. The estate agents, lawyers, buyers and sell-
ers were all breaking the law – it’s clear people were doing that
as properties were exchanging hands. . .Other schemes operated
as clubs – they could get around the law by servicing members
– you donate and we give you groceries, or fuel coupons or
build your property or whatever.
Diaspora funds came in via private arrangements – some guys
did private swaps – it was illegal, but done via lawyers! You’d
put the property into a company, leave it like that for a while
and then when you want to sell, sell shares of the company to
the value of the house. The old director resigns and hands over
to the new director and the house has changed hands! There27 Interview, Thomas, building for his brother in Ruwa, 13/04/11.
28 Pers comm. following a presentation of an early version of this paper, 25/06/2011.
29 Pers comm. Member MDC-M, Bulawayo, 25/08/10.
30 Towards the end of 2008, there were provisions for permits to trade in foreign
currency (‘foliwas’) and for property transactions (‘poliwas’).
31 Interview, asset manager, Harare, 15/12/10.
32 Interview, asset manager, Harare, 10/08/10.
37 Ibid.
38 Interview, asset manager, Harare, 16/12/10; interview, director property com-
pany and member, EAC, 22/03/11.
39 Interview, director property company, Harare, 6/04/11; asset manager, Harare,
16/12/10.
40 In the UK, the former head of the Afﬁrmative Action Group, Supa Mupandawira
helped promote the venture, with journalist Charles Mtetwa and a London-based
Zimbabwean PR ﬁrm researched feasibility.
41 RBZ estimates of annual remittances were US$1.2bn (in 2002) and US$76m (in
2007). IFAD ﬁgures are similar-US$1.3bn in 2004, and US$361m in 2007. UNDP
estimates US$1.4bn in 2009 (Masiiwa and Doroh, 2011: 9).
42 Flows via Homelink tumbled to US$18.2m in 2005 and further to US$6.5m in
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were entitled to take money outside... No one was monitoring.
Also people going on the back of others and lots of other ways.
I was transacting in fuel coupons. . .
We were getting the fuel coupons from the middlemen, who
wanted them to avoid RBZ taking their share of money, which
could be up to 100% because RBZ had no money – it might have
been your money, but they’d reject your application to have it.
So people bought outside the banks, did exports and bought
products which they used to buy oil and then take it to the oil
companies and get fuel coupons. So your fuel coupons could
be used everywhere, in shops, estate agents, anywhere.33
As many emigrés struggled to mobilise the cash for an outright
purchase of their dream home, companies developed loan schemes
involving negotiated monthly repayments. These schemes were
risky for investors because they were not buying a property, but
were buying into a plan, and there was no legal protection. As
one investment manager explained:
The middle/high class schemes that have grown up, take one
well known business man who has 5 of these schemes, my cli-
ent, he has obtained municipal land on which he says he will
build houses. . . He’ll show you the plan, ‘this is what the prop-
erty will look like that is going to be developed’. . .you need to
pay a deposit, let’s say of $300 and then you make monthly pro-
gress payments... More often than not, the money has not been
applied in the way it is supposed to. . . Unfortunately our legal
system has not been able to protect them in that kind of
scheme. It can’t be fraud because plans can be modiﬁed and
may be realised in the future.34
Diasporans unable to visit Zimbabwe were vulnerable to a
range of tricks. One asset manager cited the case of a client conned
into buying a non-available house:
Yesterday a friend called from Australia, he was buying a prop-
erty from X, he’d already transferred the money to X, he asked
me for advice over the contract only, the exchange had already
partly taken place. Then there was a problem, X had nothing to
sell, the supposed vacant property had been advertised fraudu-
lently. So the police were brought in, and the police only came
in because he had an uncle in the police force! It will end with
him losing his money.35
The deepening problem of corruption over title deeds that con-
tributed to the proliferation of fraudulent business was explained
to me in the following terms:
The title deeds ofﬁce problem had to do with the crisis and the
fact that people left and others were taking advantage of their
title deeds, the paperwork they left behind because of their
mortgages. People were going to the deeds ofﬁce and making
copies and trying to transact with them. . .If employees have
been crooked at the deeds ofﬁce, copies of others’ deeds can
be transacted on...36
Professionals agree that there is a ‘lack of accountability in the
sector, particularly in relation to joint ventures with developers’.
One executive member of the Real Estate Institute estimated that
‘a large proportion of the estate agents in business in 2010 are33 Interview, director property company and executive REI, 6/04/11.
34 Interview, asset manager, 10/08/10.
35 Interview, asset manager 16/12/10.
36 Interview, director property company and REI executive, 6/04/11.not reputable – maybe as much as 50%’.37 The Estate Agents Council
provides accreditation to members, but if a company proves itself to
be unaccountable, can do little other than strike them off their list,
and refer the case to the police. Developers on the other hand, ‘are
not covered by the Estate Agents Act and can steal with impunity’.38
The control that supposedly came through local authority standards
was eroded through politicisation and deregulation (Marongwe
et al., 2011; McGregor, 2013). There have been ‘few if any successful
cases against fraudulent agents or developers as the police do not
understand property law and the property developers can have
connections’.39
It was in the context of these increasingly irregular trends in
urban property development that the government’s own scheme
for diaspora investment was set up.Homelink
Homelink was set up by the RBZ in 2004 to provide a suppos-
edly secure channel through which diaspora members in the UK,
South Africa, Australia, Canada and USA could remit money or
buy property and land back in Zimbabwe. Homelink agents worked
closely with Embassy ofﬁcials to put on road-shows led by RBZ
Governor Gono himself.40 RBZ commissioned research, which rec-
ommended that the project should be unfolded to include those
without papers, who had particular interests in remitting given the
risk of losing assets through deportation.
RBZ’s own ﬁgures show that Homelink did increase the ﬂows of
foreign exchange coming through government channels some-
what, even if the amounts clearly fell way short of the potential,
making up only a tiny fraction of overall remittances, estimated
as up to US$1.4billion p.a.41 Prior to the scheme’s launch, an insig-
niﬁcant proportion of remittances ﬂowed through RBZ (US$1.4m,
falling to US$1.1m p.a by 2003). Yet this ﬁgure rose signiﬁcantly to
US$61m in 2004, rising and falling thereafter depending on the dis-
crepancy between the ofﬁcial and black market rates (Zanamwe and
Devillard, 2009).42
Opposition to the ZANU(PF) government contributed to Home-
link’s poor performance, as the MDC campaigned against it, on the
grounds that using Homelink meant providing ﬁnancial support to
ZANU(PF). But it was not only politics and unattractive exchange
rates that undercut operations. Homelink was also beset by a fur-
ther range of problems reﬂecting the broader informalisation of the
economy including property markets. One of those involved with
Homelink in the UK described operations as ‘disorderly’, ‘chaotic’
and ‘clandestine’.43 RBZ had no history of working in property or
dealing with mortgages, and initially did not have a bank account
in the UK. Homelink operated via agents chosen for their connec-
tions rather than professional expertise. The main agents in the UK
were accused of various forms of irregular practice, including2006 after RBZ launched the tradable foreign currency balances system (TFCBS) which
provided for a dual exchange rate system that compared unfavourably with black
market rates. But in 2007–2008 formal channels increased again, with US$48.5m and
US$76m going through Homelink, as the differences between formal and informal
systems narrowed (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009).
43 Interview 17/10/11.
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accounts and deliberately delaying transactions to maximise proﬁts.
Homelink charged clients a registration fee of £250 and then
facilitated connections with estate agents and developers in Zim-
babwe. Clients could buy outright or negotiate a loan to be paid
off through monthly instalments. Despite accusations of irregular
practice, some people bought property successfully through Home-
link, particularly those who were linked up with reputable Zim-
babwean estate agents, and those who bought in the high
density suburbs without the need for loans. Of the seven clients
we interviewed,44 one described satisfaction with a new medium
density home in Harare’s Avondale West (bought for US$38,000,
which thereafter doubled in value) and felt the process was ‘hassle
free’. Another two were also satisﬁed with their ﬁnal properties
and the amounts they had paid, although the process had been con-
voluted because they had to swap initially substandard properties,
either by ﬂying to Zimbabwe and personally making a fuss in the
Homelink ofﬁce or by resorting to irregular deals. Two were disgrun-
tled and echoed complaints made in the press noted at the outset:
they felt they had been conned, paid too much, and had lost signif-
icant sums and properties by failing to keep up with instalments. A
further two were unhappy, but still ‘on talking terms with Home-
link’, trying to renegotiate payments and salvage their properties
and outlays. The monthly instalments (often between £500–800)
were challenging to sustain, and those who pulled out of the scheme
part way through or had properties repossessed through High Court
orders were bitter at their losses. One elaborated: ‘It’s frustrating and
depressing – I worked very hard and put so much into this property,
and thinking about having it repossessed is difﬁcult to take, seeing
my dream shattered. I’m angry because this was an expensive mort-
gage [just under US$44,000] to milk our hard earning foreign cur-
rency. . . the issue has created some tension within our family too’.45
The allegations of substandard properties sold via Homelink
were not restricted to the Charlotte Brooke scheme, detailed at
the outset. Another instance concerned an estate of medium den-
sity homes bought by Homelink from the developer Champion
Construction in Harare’s Mainway Meadows, which allegedly
failed local authority building standards. Some properties on the
Champion estate were said to have been sold fraudulently 2 or 3
times to different individuals, and no title deeds were available
to purchasers because the homes were poor quality.46 A group of
occupiers were trying to sue Champion for substandard construc-
tion, hoping to use the civil courts to get compensation.47 As
Homelink’s reputation waned, estates initially intended for sale to
diasporans were put back on the local market, and were said to have
been offered to army families, magistrates and civil servants within
Zimbabwe, and thus formed part of an unfolding urban politics of
patronage.Power-sharing and withdrawal of the Zimbabwe Dollar
The initial effects of the withdrawal of the Zimbabwe Dollar in
2009 were to remove the advantages of foreign currency, such that
property prices stagnated and sales fell.48 The timing coincided
with the effects of global recession, which undermined migrants’
capacity to ﬁnd work and remit. Property development was paraly-
sed. Cash-strapped clients were reluctant to pay the ‘top up’ fees
companies requested and some businesses failed. Zimbabwe’s econ-44 Five interviews were conducted in the UK by Forward Maisokwazo, 09–12/11;
two interviews were conducted in Harare by Tinashe Nyamunda.
45 Interview, 16/09/11.
46 Interview, local resident and owner of a Champion House, Waterfalls, Harare
24/08/11.
47 Ibid.
48 My sources in the property business agreed on this initial stagnation.omy improved, but remained unstable. Those in the property busi-
ness pointed to some positive developments, such as the
availability of foreign exchange trust fund accounts, and new 10 year
mortgage schemes.49 But policies of indigenisation and empower-
ment discouraged investment and encouraged funds to ﬂow out of
Zimbabwe. There was a shift in how migrants managed assets and
a new trend towards disposal. One asset manager recounted:
Of late with the liberalisation of foreign exchange requirements,
diasporans are selling their homes here – I think they believe
the political uncertainty is here to stay. I think it is quite a trend,
over the last year there was a turnaround and there is now a
trend towards disposals.50
Another concurred there was a ﬂight of capital, to which dis-
trust of banks contributed:
There is a ﬂight of capital – it’s leaving, people are saying ‘I’ll get
my money out, buy a property in South Africa its more stable or
somewhere my returns are safe’. . . Then the expats, the money
they were bringing in has also dried up, people are beginning to
lose jobs. . . In terms of the banking system, there are no depos-
its coming through, as soon as people get paid, they take out
their money, or if you receive something outside the banks
you don’t deposit it, they don’t trust the banks anymore, all
the money is sitting in the informal sector or sitting at
home. . .Including us in the ﬁnancial sector, we don’t trust our
institutions, anyone can take it any time. So our company, for
example, we’re setting up rescue accounts outside for all the lia-
bilities that might arise.51
The transformations to state institutions during the crisis period
had legacies, including a lingering distrust of ﬁnancial and other
institutions. Court cases relating to property have generally
favoured the state and large companies. Homelink, for example,
successfully repossessed properties from transnational customers
defaulting on their loan repayments, while Old Mutual pursued a
slew of evictions through the courts.52 Other cases are backlogged
pending a decision on how to deal with Zimbabwe Dollar accounts
and prices. Those in the property business argued that attitudes
within the property sector needed to change to win back trust:
The Zimbabwe Dollar mentality has to change – by which I
mean the make a quick buck attitude, but also the risk taking
without consequences. We need to unlearn that way of working
and also learn a new way where there are some rules and
accountability.53
The on-going political instability, the tenuous and insecure
economy recovery, and the receding prospects of a clear political
transition in Zimbabwe all contributed to diasporic investment
strategies that straddle locations, prioritise creating a ‘fallback’
outside and options for future mobility, rather than simply insur-
ing Zimbabwean futures.Conclusion
By elaborating the moral- and political-economies of transna-
tional investment and its materialisation as urban property in49 Interview, investment manager, Harare, 16/03/10; interview, property company
director and executive, 6/04/11.
50 Interview, director of property company and EAC executive 22/03/11.
51 Interview, asset manager, Harare, 10/08/10.
52 Interview, judge, Harare, 24/08/10.
53 Interview property company director and REI executive, 6/04/11.
180 J. McGregor / Geoforum 56 (2014) 172–181Zimbabwe, the article aimed to extend debates over the relation-
ship between migrants and cities. Existing analyses of migrants’
role in urban ‘rescaling’ have focussed on countries of settlement
rather than countries of emigration (Glick Schiller and Çaglar,
2011). At the same time, debates over middle class emigrés’
building projects in homelands have often concentrated primarily
on emigrants’ aspirations, with relatively little attention to the
intersection between these desires and the political economy of
urban governance, which together produce the ‘high quality resi-
dential sprawl’ of African city peripheries (though see Yeboah,
2003; Grant 2005). Existing studies have invoked neoliberalism
as an over-arching shaping force, but have often dwelt insufﬁ-
ciently on politics, particularly the role of informalised state
regimes over ﬁnance and urban real estate. The alternative frame-
work and Zimbabwean case presented here casts new middle class
‘diaspora suburbs’ and migrant building projects in Harare and
environs as the material expression of intersecting moral econo-
mies of investment and political-economies of urban governance.
This case revealed the inadequacies of existing a-political frame-
works particularly starkly because the crisis was a period when
many neo-liberal politics were reversed, when state power was
recentralised and irregular business proliferated in the realms of
both ﬁnance and urban property.
The article also provided a critique of dominant policy debates
over migrant investment, focussing on misleading underpinning
assumptions – particularly those of diasporic social embeddedness
in the homeland, and of convergent interests within transnational
families. It elaborated a series of alternate starting propositions
that focussed on strains within families, and potentially divergent
interests, placing emphasis on the importance of changing state
governance and irregular practices and informalised state regimes.
The need to put the politics back into debates over migrant invest-
ment is particularly transparent in crises, which produce diasporas
that are politicised and heterogenous, such that relations to rapidly
changing homelands require careful historicisation (Smith and
Stares, 2007). Romanticised understandings of transnational family
networks as ‘risk reduction mechanisms’ fail to capture the poten-
tial for a rapid diasporic disconnect and related tensions in rela-
tions with home. As Lubkemann (2008) has argued, predatory
businesses can ﬂourish during crises, and deserves as much atten-
tion as social entrepreneurship and philanthropy: his study of the
Liberian postwar transition period emphasises ‘rampant corrup-
tion and criminality’. In the case considered here, the collapsing
value of the Zimbabwe Dollar and irregular markets in money
and property provided opportunities for ordinary migrants with
foreign currency to make signiﬁcant material gains. But emigrés
unable to travel regularly back and forwards and lacking political
connections at home often did not possess superior knowledge
that worked to reduce risks of investing in an unstable homeland.
Rather their sentimentality and poor understanding of speculative
irregular economies made them vulnerable to tricksters exploiting
fantasies of successful return to dream homes.
Although the particular case study was of a crisis context, and
as such revealed the failings of migration and development policy
discourses particularly clearly, my argument is not just about cri-
ses. Rather, it has a broader application, and I argue that the alter-
nate starting propositions elaborated here also provide a better set
of assumptions more generally, including for ‘normal’ develop-
mental contexts. The irregular state governance that characterised
Zimbabwean property and ﬁnancial markets during the crisis years
has similarities not only with accounts of extraordinary credit and
property bubbles generated during post-socialist transitions in
southern and former Eastern Block cities (Woodworth and
Ulfstjerne, 2014 on Ordos, China; Verdery, 1995 on Romania), but
also with episodes and spaces of informalised urban governance
in cities more generally (see Roy on Indian cities 2009). The pointis not to cast all transnational ﬁnance or urban governance in Afri-
can contexts crudely as extensions to neo-patrimonial modes of
rule. Indeed, the label ‘neo-patrimonial’ is inappropriate for the
Zimbabwean case, due to the strength of the state and long history
of well consolidated bureaucratic institutions (Alexander and
McGregor, 2013). Rather, the aim is to capture moments, spaces
and networks in which informalised governance is signiﬁcant or
predominates, and to reﬂect the tensions produced within families
trying to navigate remitting, building and other aspects of long dis-
tance transnational lives.
Transnationality is not a new feature of Zimbabwean upper
class residential suburbs, as these were created initially to house
white settlers with a wealth of international and regional ties,
and there is also a long history of regional migrant labour. But
the phase of investment and building during the crisis decade
reﬂected a combination of the status and return aspirations of sec-
tions of a large new diaspora, together with the beneﬁcial irregular
currency conversions and speculative opportunities for property
development. Middle class emigrés were differentially placed in
relation to the new informalised economy, which was intimately
linked to the reconﬁguration of state institutions and ZANU(PF)
party/state power. The protracted instability and limited economic
recovery mean that the quest for secure futures hinges on political
and economic investments outside as well as within Zimbabwe, as
the majority of those who left continue to defer ideas about return
(Mortensen, 2014). By arguing that debates over diasporic invest-
ment and entrepreneurship should scrutinise accusations against
‘homethieves’ and investigate irregular services does not mean
that all transnational business networks should be condemned as
extensions of coherent, corrupt state regimes. Rather, it means
investigating the political and moral economies of transnational
investment, historicizing the diverse and shifting familial and busi-
ness networks through which ﬁnance ﬂows, and the regulatory
regimes that govern its conversion into urban property. The new
diaspora suburbs and building projects constructed during Zimba-
bwe’s crisis years stand as a material testimony to the combined
effects of disaporic sentimentality and the speculative opportuni-
ties of the country’s informalised hyperinﬂationary economy.
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